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Among the rationales for social security, there is the fact that some people have to be forced to 
save. To explain undersaving, rational prodigality and hyperbolic preferences are often cited 
but treated separably. In this paper we study those two particular behaviors that lead to forced 
saving within an optimal income tax second-best setting. 
 
Keywords: social security, myopia, dual-self model, prodigality. 
JEL Classification: H55, D91 
                                                             
1 CREPP, University of Liège; CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Belgium; PSE and CEPR. 
Email: p.pestieau@ulg.ac.be 
2 Department of Economics, Cornell University, USA. 
 
This paper presents research results of the Belgian Program on Interuniversity Poles of Attraction initiated 
by the Belgian State, Prime Minister's Office, Science Policy Programming. The scientific responsibility is 
assumed by the authors.  1 Introduction
Several rationales have been given for government involvement in social se-
curity. First, the government may wish to provide resources to the poor who
are income constrained and would, without government help, be unable to
support themselves in their later years. If society were made up only of the
poor and the rich, the government could set up a means tested welfare type
of system where resources were transferred from the rich to the poor. A sec-
ond rationale for social security is the necessity of forcing some people, who
are not poor and thus not income constrained, to save. This necessity arises
from two diﬀerent types of behavioral inclinations. Individuals try to balance
two objectives: instant gratiﬁcation and retirement planning. As behavioral
economics shows, and more convincingly, the evidence found of insuﬃcient
saving in societies that do not have generous social security, individuals err
on the side of using too much of their resources for instant gratiﬁcation
and not enough to plan for retirement. To try to address this problem the
government can set up a non-means tested social security scheme that intro-
duces inducements to get the "myopic" types to save more than they would
have if the saving decision were left completely in their hands. In setting up
a government run retirement system to induce the "myopics" to save, the
government is also providing incentives for others in society to save more.
These incentives will result in the poor having higher consumption in their
retirement years than they would have had otherwise.
Once a government sets up a social security scheme that provides mini-
mum pensions that can be means tested, an additional situation arises. When
individuals know that the government will always bail out retirees without
resources through minimum pensions that can be means tested, some indi-
viduals may try to consume all their resources during the ﬁrst part of their
lives, counting on the government to provide them with the minimum pen-
sion in their old age. One can speak of prodigality for these types who count
on the intervention of the state to act as a "Good Samaritan" when they
are old. Prodigality also provides a strong case fo a public pension system
that forces these individuals to save for retirement. One way in which the
government can reduce the incentives for individuals to act as prodigals is
by reducing the size of the minimum pension. While such a policy will result
in the potential prodigals increasing their saving (since it is now less worth
their while to act as prodigals), the policy will also end up reducing the level
of consumption of the poor in their retirement.
Myopia and prodigality both provide incentives for individuals to un-
dersave for retirement. Thus, when these types of individuals are present
a strong case can be made for a public pension system that forces these
2two types of individuals to increase saving. In inducing these individuals
to change their behavior, however, the government will also have an eﬀect
on the other individuals in the economy. Myopia and prodigality have been
studied separately. Myopia has been studied by Feldstein (1985) and more
recently by Imorohoroglu et al. (1999). It has also received a lot of attention
in recent years with the emergence of behavioral economics that explores the
possible conﬂict between our preference for the long run and our short run
behavior.1
There exists evidence that households have self-control problems in saving
that calls for commitment devices such as social security. Quite interestingly,
self-control problems vindicate an idea that was for long controversial, that
of a paternalistic role for the government. Prodigality goes back to Hayek
but has recently been discussed by Homburg (2000) and von Weizsacker
(2003). It rests on the idea that in most societies there exists a means tested
minimum pension that creates an incentive for some individuals not to save
for old age and instead to free ride. Under some assumptions, prodigality
should be addressed by a mandatory pension system.
The purpose of this paper is to combine these two sources of undersaving
within an optimal income tax setting. As we show, self-selection constraints
involving these two distortions have interesting implications regarding the
size and the redistributiveness of the optimal pension system. For example,
focusing on the welfare of the worse-oﬀ in society, we show that prodigality
hurts the poor less than myopia; we also show that mixing prodigals and
myopics hurts more the poor than just having only myopics or prodigals.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents
the basic model and the ﬁrst-best solution. Section 3 is devoted to the case
of myopia without prodigality. Individuals there are committed to some con-
sumption in the two periods of their life. In section 4, commitment is assumed
away and we have prodigality. Numerical examples are given in section 5. A
ﬁnal section concludes.
2 The model. First-best and decentralization
We consider a two-period economy with a given interest rate (here equal to
zero) and wage rates that diﬀer by individual. There are four types of indi-
viduals that are distinguished accordi n gt ot h e i rw a g ea n dt i m ep r e f e r e n c e .
1See Angeletos et al. (2001), Diamond and Koszegi (2003), Cremer et al. (2006),
Tenhunen and Tuomala (2006).
See also Cremer et al. (2007a,b) who adopt a linear tax schedule and a political economy
approach respectively.
3We consider a separable utility function:
Ui = u(ci)+βu (di) − v( i)
where u(·) and v(·) are respectively strictly concave and convex, ci and di
denote ﬁrst and second period consumption and  i is the labor supplied in
the ﬁr s tp e r i o d .T h ep a r a m e t e rβ is a factor of time preference. In the second
period individuals are retired.
Our four types are presented on Table 1.
Types Wage rate Time preference
H: high productivity w2 1
L: low productivity w0 1
M:m y o p i c w2 or w1 0 6 β<1
P:p r o d i g a l s w1 1
Table 1 - Types of individuals
As an extreme case, we will take β =0 . We assume w2 >w 1 >w 0.
Here the myopic individual has either a high or a middle productivity, to
keep the presentation simple. We thus have a society consisting of four types:
productive and rational workers, myopic individuals with high or middle pro-
ductivity, middle productivity workers and low productivity workers. Myopic
individuals don’t want to save because their immediate "self" incites them
to get instant gratiﬁcation. Yet their rational "self" would welcome a gov-
ernment inducing them to provide for their retirement. We do not allow the
myopics to have low income because we want the government intervention to
be due to their behavior and not to low income. Middle income individuals
realize that a utilitarian government will always provide for the retirement of
low productivity workers. If they could, they would be tempted to spend all
their saving in the ﬁrst period of their life and then, being penniless, claim
assistance in old age. The prodigals are not allowed to have high productivity
because the higher their income the harder it is for them to credibly pretend
to be individuals with low income.
With wM = w2 and βM =0 ,t h elaissez-faire solution can be described
very simply as:
cH = dH ;  H is deﬁned by u0 (cH)w2 − v0 ( H)=0
cM >c H ; dM =0 ;  M <  H
cP = dP <c H ;  P <  H
4cL = dL <c P.
The ﬁrst two inequalities come from the fact that the myopic individuals
focus on a single period. If wM = w1,c M ≶ cH but cM >c P.
We now turn to the ﬁrst-best solution. As alluded to above, the govern-
ment has a non welfarist paternalistic objective; it does not take into account
the preferences of the myopic, but rather those of his rational self with β =1 .













ni (ci + di − yi)
where μ is the Lagrangean multiplier associated with the resource constraint,
yi denotes gross earning (yi = wi i), and ni is the fraction of workers of type
i. With such an objective, the optimal allocation is standard:
ci = di = constant for all
 H >  P >  L; H =  M for wM = w2,  M =  P for wM = w1.
In other words, the more productive individuals end up with a lower utility.
Can we decentralize such an optimum?
For types H, P and L al u m ps u mt a xs u ﬃces. They will choose the
optimal levels of consumption and labor supply. For type M,w eh a v et o
distinguish the case of βM =0from that of βM > 0.W h e n βM > 0,
an individualized linear saving subsidy σ can be introduced so that with
σ =1− βM,t h elaissez-faire condition
u
0 (cM)(1− σ)=βM u
0 (dM)




When βM =0 , laissez-faire saving is 0 and one has to resort to non linear
subsidies or quantity control.
3 Second-best with commitment
In general, the above instruments are not readily available; governments
do not have all the information concerning productivity, labor supply and
5preferences. We ﬁrst consider the case where the government can commit to
a policy for the two periods concerned. In other words, prodigality is not
possible. As the government does not observe productivity nor preferences,
it has to choose allocations which prevent certain types from mimicking other
types to get a more attractive (c, d, y) package. We choose the parameters of
our model in such a way that a limited number of self-selection constraints are
binding.2 We thus keep as binding self-selection constraints: HM, HP, HL,
MP, ML, PL,a n d PMwhere, for example, HM means "type H is better oﬀ
with his own package (cH, dH, yH) than with that of type M (cM, dM, yM).
The type L’s are the ones with the lowest productivity. They would love
to switch places with the other types but they do not have the economic
wherewithal to make such a switch feasible. Thus, one would not expect LH,
LM, or LP to bind. We also assume that PH is not binding. If the type
P’s had high enough productivity that they would be better oﬀ than the
type H’s, it would be diﬃcult for them to act a prodigals in the sense of
pretending to be type L’s. This consideration is irrelevant at this stage given
that prodigality is assumed away. It will turn relevant in the following section.
Lastly we assume that MH does not bind. If the myopics have suﬃciently
high productivity that they they feel that they are better oﬀ than the type
H’s, they are rich enough that they do not have to act as myopics. As in the
previous section we assume that wM is either w2 or w1.
2This selection is veriﬁed by our numerical examples, some of which are presented
below.
63.1 The 4-type case
































































































where i is an index that represents individuals.
The FOC’s are presented in the appendix. Not surprisingly there is no




= wH. Note that if there were no myopia, ci = di for all


















In other words, myopia here implies that cM >d M, cL <d L and cP <d P.
In order to induce the myopic individuals to increase their consumption in
the second period beyond what they would if there were no government
incentives, both the low productivity individuals and the prodigal types will
7b ep e r s u a d e dt oc o n s u m em o r ei nt h es e c o n dp e r i o dt h a ni nt h eﬁrst. When
wM = w1,t h eMP constraint is not binding and cP = dP.


















































































































































One should note that when wM >w 1, constraint PM is not binding and
so μPM =0 . Moreover, when wM = w2, the wage rate of the high productivity
type, there is no labor distortion for the myopic individual. However, when
wM <w 2, as for example when wM = w1, t h em y o p i ct y p e sa r es u b j e c tt o
a downward distortion. The above relationships also indicate that P and L
are subject to a downward distortion. Note that when wM = w1, the last
term in the MRSP equation drops out but nonetheless there is still a labor
distortion for the P types.
83.2 Commitment with no rich individuals
A special case of the above model occurs when there are no rich individuals.
We look at the case where wM = w1, the myopic individuals face the same
wage as the prodigal types. In that case MP does not bind although PM
is likely to. Given that the prodigals cannot act as such, they behave in a
standard way. From the ﬁr s to r d e rc o n d i t i o n so n en o t i c e st h a tt h em y o p i c
individuals would prefer to consume in period 1 and so cM >d M.T h e
government policy that tries to shift some of the myopic’s consumption to
period one results in the poor consuming more in period 2 and so cL <
dL. Lastly, the prodigals in this case act rationally and consume the same
amounts in both periods, i.e., cP = dP.
Looking at the labor supply one notices that there is no labor distortion
for either the myopic individuals or the prodigal types. In this case only the
poor face a downward labor market distortion.
4 Second-best with non-commitment
We now turn to the case where some individuals have the possibility of con-
suming all their (disposable) earnings in the ﬁrst period and then claiming
in the second the beneﬁtg r a n t e dt ot h ep o o r( h e r ei n d i v i d u a l so ft y p eL).
For this to be possible we adopt the assumption that the government cannot
observe that kind of strategic move by what we call the prodigals. Further,
we assume that the potential prodigals do not have to mimick the poor in
terms of earnings. This leads to the self-selection constraint:
u(cP)+u(dP) − u(cP + dP) − u(dL) > 0.
This constraint means that the government can make a means test in the
second period but cannot link the awarding of a minimum pension to lifetime
resources. In this IC constraint both the mimicker and the mimicked have
the same earnings.
In Appendix 1 we deal with the case where the prodigals mimick type L
i nt e r m so fe a r n i n g sa sw e l l .N a m e l y :
u(cP)+u(dP) − v(yP/w1) − u(cP + dP) − u(dL)+v(yL/w1) > 0.
For either case, we have not only the constraint PL,b u ta l s oPM.
94.1 The 4-type case










































































+μPM[u(cP)+u(dP) − u(cP + dP) − u(dM)]
where, as above, the wage of the myopic individuals, wM, can take the values
of either w2 or w1.
The FOC’s for the case of non-commitment are given in Appendix 2.
A si nt h ec a s ew i t hc o m m i t m e n t ,t h e r ei sn od i s t o r t i o na tt h et o p .M o r e -
over, if there were no myopia it is easy to see that ci = di for types H and P,
but unlike the case with commitment, even with no myopia ci 6= di for types
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When there is non-commitment and myopia cM >d M and cP 6 dP.( W h e n
wM = w1, cP = dP because in that situation the MP constraint is not
binding.) There are two factors operating on the relationship between dP
and cP. Myopia tends to make dP >c P and the prodigality eﬀect works to
reduce the gap. Of course if there were no myopia, cP = dP.
It is not possible to determine the relationship between cL and dL theoret-
ically for non-commitment. There are two factors that aﬀect the relationship.
When there are few myopic individuals in the economy relative to prodigals,
cL >d L. In that case the government reduces dL to lower the incentives for
the prodigals to act as such. Of course in the process the government makes
the type L’s bear some of the burden from the policy of reducing incen-
tives for the prodigals. On the other hand, when there is a preponderance
of myopic individuals relative to prodigals, cL <d L. In this situation, the
government by providing incentives for the myopics to increase their savings
h a st h i se ﬀect spill over to the poor who increase their saving as well.









































































































As in the case of commitment, when wM = w2, there is no labor market
distortion for the myopic individuals. However, when wM = w1,t h em y o p i c
individuals will face downward distortion. Individuals P and L are also sub-
ject to downward distortion, but less so than in the case of commitment.
11(One should note that in our numerical examples with four individuals the P
types were subject to a downward distortion; however, theoretically we can-
not guarantee that in all cases the distortion will be downward. For example,
when there are no rich individuals, see below, the government subsidizes the
prodigals.)
4.2 Non-commitment with no rich individuals
As i m p l i ﬁed version of the above model is to do away with the rich individu-
a l s .I fo n ea l s oa s s u m e st h a tt h ew a g eo ft h em y o p i ci n d i v i d u a l si st h es a m e
as the wage of the prodigals, the complexity is greatly reduced. In that situa-
tion, cP = dP and cM >d M. The relationship between cL and dL will depend
on the relative numbers of the myopics and prodigals. When there are no
myopics in the economy, cL >d L and when there are no prodigals, cL <d L.
One can ﬁnd a proportion of the two types at which they just balance each
other oﬀ so that cL = dL.
In terms of labor supply, the myopic individuals face no distortion whereas
the poor individuals face a downward labor market distortion. For the prodi-













[u0 (cP) − u0 (cP + dP)]
) > 1.
Thus, for this particular example the government subsidizes the prodigals to
work. By subsidizing the prodigals, the government is trying to reduce their
incentives to mimick both L and M.
5 Numerical example
The discussion above indicates clearly that we are left with a number of
ambiguous cases. To add some more insights we look at a numerical example
with a log-linear utility function:
u(c,d, )=l nc +l nd +l n( 1−  ).
W es t a r tw i t ht h et h r e et y p ec a s e ,n a m e l yw i t ht h ec a s ew i t hn or i c hi n d i -
viduals.
125 . 1 T h et h r e et y p ec a s e
We start by using a simpliﬁed version of the non-commitment case where
there are only three types: myopic and prodigal workers with w1 =5and
unskilled workers with w0 =3 . Unskilled workers represent 25% of the whole
population. The relative percentage of myopics, π, goes from 0 to 75%.
Table 2 gives some of the outcomes of this simulation. For each value of
π, the ﬁrst row gives the values of c and d and the binding constraints; the
second row gives the utility levels and the third row the marginal rate of
substitution between ﬁrst period consumption and leisure.
We focus ﬁrst on the two extreme cases (π =0and .75) and then turn
to the intermediate cases. When there are no myopics, only the constraint
PL is relevant. Type L is subject to a tax on his saving (dL <c L) but not
on his labor supply; type P is not subject to a tax on saving but his labor
is marginally subsidized. This odd outcome can be explained by the concern
of not having type P behave as a prodigal. When there are no prodigals, we
have the standard Stiglitz result for the labor supply: no distortion at the
top and a tax on type L. Regarding the saving choice, M is taxed and L is
subsidized. All these distortions occur to satisfy the only active self-selection
constraint ML. In utility terms, type L is better oﬀ with π =0than with
π = .75. In other words, myopia penalizes the poor more than prodigality.
With myopia, the self-selection constraint implies that the poor consume
m o r ei nt h es e c o n dp e r i o dt h a ni nt h eﬁrst.
Turning to the intermediate cases, we ﬁr s tn o t et h a tm o s tv a r i a b l e sd o n ’ t
evolve monotonically. Starting with the saving choice, we have cP = dP for
all values of π but cL ≷ dL for π ≶ .25; as to the myopics, cM −dM is positive
but decreases with π. G i v e nt h a tb o t hc o n s t r a i n t sPM and PLare binding,
dL = dM. For the poor, the utility reaches a minimum for π =4 5 % .
Let us now look at the labor choice. There is no distortion on M,a
downward distortion on L (except when π =0 )a n da nu p w a r dd i s t o r t i o no n
P that increases with π. As π increases, the utility of P increases; the utility
of M and L ﬁrst decrease and then increase.
Table 2
The 3 type case
13%m y o p i c s LMP I C
0 c/d 1.93/1.52 - 2.02/2.02 PL
U -0.428 - -0.401
MRS 3.00 - 5.73
5 1.80/1.53 2.33/1.53 2.03/2.03 ML,PL,PM
-0.447 -.0376 -0.401
2.57 5.00 5.92
15 1.66/1.56 2.21/1.56 2.06/2.06 ML,PL,PM
-0.473 -0.397 0.397
2.08 5.00 6.32
25 1.58/1.59 2.14/1.59 2.10/2.10 ML,PL,PM
-0.487 -0.409 -0.389
1.82 5.00 6.80
35 1.53/1.63 2.09/1.63 2.16/2.16 ML,PL,PM
-0.4936 -0.4142 -0.380
1.67 5.00 7.38
45 1.49/1.68 2.06/1.68 2.22/2.22 ML,PL,PM
-0.4945 -0.4142 -0.369
1.57 5.00 8.08
55 1.47/1.74 2.04/1.74 2.30/2.30 ML,PL,PM
-0.4909 -0.4103 -0.355
1.49 5.00 8.96
65 1.45/1.81 2.02/1.81 2.40/2.40 ML,PL,PM
-0.483 -0.4028 -0.340
1.44 5.00 10.08
70 1.44/1.85 2.01/1.85 2.45/2.45 ML,PL,MP, PM
-0.478 -0.3976 -0.252
1.42 5.00 10.91
75 1.44/1.90 2.01/1.90 - ML
-0.472 -0.392 -
1.40 5.00 -
5.2 The four-type case
We now add an additional type: the workers with productivity w2 =1 0 .I n
the begining, we assume equal sizes for the four groups (nH = nL = nM =
nP).T y p eH has a wage of 10, type P has 5 and type L, 3. Myopic individuals
are given diﬀerent wages 10,7,5.M y o p i am e a n sβ =0 ; otherwise, β =1 .W e
look at three cases wherein the myopic are given a wage rate wM =1 0 ,7,5.
In Table 3 the results for the case of commitment are presented. When the
myopic individual has a discount factor βM =1 , he is not myopic anymore.
14In other words, example 3.1, 3.3 and 3.5 are standard examples of optimal
income taxation. In 3.1, H and M are treated identically; in 3.5, M and P
are also treated equally. The MRS between labor and consumption is to be
compared with the wage rate. MRSH =1 0is the standard non distortion
value one obtains at the top. In 3.1, MRSL =1 .726 < 3 and MRSP =
2.341 < 5 implying a positive marginal income tax.
In Table 4 we present the results for non-commitment. Whereas in Table
3 the prodigals do not act as prodigals and so the main driving force for the
results are the myopics, in Table 4 we can see how myopics and prodigals
interact. A discussion of the results for Tables 3 and 4 follow the tables.
Table 3
Numerical example. Commitment
3.1. βM =1; wM =1 0
cdy M R S U
H 2.840 2.840 7.587 10.000 -0.2068
L 2.069 2.069 1.740 1.726 -0.2619
M 2.840 2.840 7.586 10.000 -0.2068
P 2.210 2.210 3.004 2.341 -0.2373
3.2. βM =0; wM =1 0
cdy M R S U
H 2.834 2.834 7.602 10.000 -0.2080
L 1.974 2.134 1.748 1.5214 -0.2668
M 2.951 2.508 7.302 10.000 -0.2080
P 1.990 2.508 3.080 1.8423 -0.2418
3.3. βM =1; wM =7
cdy M R S U
H 2.826 2.826 7.623 10.000 -0.2096
L 1.847 1.847 1.920 1.6510 -0.3350
M 2.269 2.269 4.971 4.1807 -0.2579
P 2.026 2.026 3.423 2.6695 -0.2985
3.4. βM =0; wM =7
cdy M R S U
H 2.760 2.760 7.806 10.000 -0.2241
L 1.854 1.992 1.896 1.609 -0.3113
M 2.488 1.981 5.017 5.667 -0.2742
P 1.945 2.378 3.440 2.396 -0.2766
153.5. βM =1; wM =5
cdy M R S U
H 2.695 2.695 7.995 10.000 -0.2398
L 1.826 1.826 1.996 1.794 -0.3489
M 2.061 2.061 3.648 3.400 -0.3062
P 2.061 2.061 3.648 3.400 -0.3062
3.6. βM =0; wM =5
cdy M R S U
H 2.683 2.683 8.031 10.000 -0.2429
L 1.715 1.970 2.008 1.514 -0.3489
M 2.157 1.952 3.624 3.822 -0.3076
P 2.046 2.046 3.590 3.173 -0.3052
Table 4
Numerical example. Without commitment
4.1. βM =1; wM =1 0
cdy M R S U
H 2.682 2.682 8.033 10.000 -0.2431
L 2.277 1.568 1.900 3.000 -0.3401
M 4.421 1.568 4.873 10.000 -0.2431
P 2.074 2.074 4.540 6.679 -0.4024
4.2. βM =0; wM =1 0
cdy M R S U
H 2.973 2.973 7.247 10.000 -0.1821
L 2.128 1.788 1.764 1.957 -0.2967
M 3.097 1.788 6.957 10.000 -0.2670
P 2.166 2.646 3.592 3.770 -0.2445
164.3. βM =1; wM =7
cdy M R S U
H 2.781 2.781 7.746 10.000 -0.2193
L 2.254 1.668 1.920 3.000 -0.3202
M 3.170 1.668 4.225 7.000 -0.2628
P 2.206 2.206 4.842 9.7503 -0.4254
4.4. βM =0; wM =7
cdy M R S U
H 2.857 2.857 7.539 10.000 -0.2033
L 1.963 1.701 1.896 1.910 -0.3425
M 2.703 1.701 4.953 7.000 -0.3039
P 2.164 2.349 3.907 4.835 -0.2907
4.5. βM =1; wM =5
cdy M R S U
H 2.765 2.765 7.792 10.000 -0.2229
L 1.908 1.628 2.015 2.105 -0.3769
M 2.442 1.628 3.501 5.000 -0.3326
P 2.154 2.154 4.135 5.650 -0.3326
4.6. βM =0; wM =5
cdy M R S U
H 2.766 2.766 7.788 10.000 -0.2237
L 1.874 1.626 2.020 2.009 -0.3830
M 2.412 1.626 3.545 5.000 -0.3382
P 2.151 2.151 4.019 5.169 -0.3205
In Table 5 one ﬁnds which self-selection constraints are binding. Note
that for 3.5, PM and MP are identical. In cases 3.1, 3.3, and 3.5 where the
discount factor, βM, i se q u a lt oo n e ,f o ra l lt y p e so fi n d i v i d u a l so n eg e t st h e
result that c = d, the Atkinson-Stiglitz result which says that intertemporal
choices will not be distorted.
Let us now turn to the case with myopia: tables 3.2,3.4, and 3.6.W h e n
βM =0 , there is no distortion at the top but Atkinson-Stiglitz no longer
holds; as expected, one ﬁnds that cM >d M. Comparing 3.1 and 3.2, one
sees that the paternalistic policy of forced saving generates a huge dividend
for the myopic (in terms of his ex post utility). Since the myopic individual
17places weight on only consumption in period 1 and leisure, and period 1
consumption for the myopic individual as well as leisure is higher in table
3.2 than in table 3.1, his utility will be higher. The other three groups are
penalized by such a policy and their utility decreases. (One should note, that
if one uses the government’s weight on the consumption for the myopic in
periods one and two, (i.e., βM =1 ), utility falls for the myopic as well in
going from table 3.1 to table 3.2.) When wM is equal to 7 or 5, the impact
on utility is less straight forward. The utility of the high productivity workers
is reduced whenever the discount factor goes from 1 to 0. The utility of the
L types is increased when wM =7in going from Table 3.3 to Table 3.4 and
stays the same when going from Table 3.5 to Table 3.6, i.e., when wM =5 .
Finally, the Prodigals see utility rise in going from Tables 3.2 to 3.3 and 3.4 to
3.5. (Note: in table 3 the Prodigals act as rational individuals.) The marginal
tax on the earnings of L and P increases as a consequence of myopia.
The other result that one wants to take away from these tables is that
when one has myopia and wM > 5, the consumption of both the L types
and the P t y p e sw i l lb eh i g h e ri nt h es e c o n dp e r i o dt h a ni nt h eﬁrst. This
non-surprising result occurs because the incentives introduced to make the
myopics consume more in the second period also provide incentives for the
L and P types to increase their consumption in period 2. Even though the
M types save less when they act as Myopics, overall savings are higher with
Myopia than without. Thus, for example, overall consumption in period two
is higher in Table 3.2 than in Table 3.1, and similarly is higher in Table 3.4
than in 3.3 and in Table 3.6 than in Table 3.5.
We now turn to the case of prodigality. So far we have compared the
case where there is neither myopia nor prodigality to the case where there is
myopia but no prodigality. Now we compare myopia with no prodigality to
the case of prodigality and no myopia and ﬁnally to the situation when there
is both myopia and prodigality.
In looking at the poor, the L types, one notices that when there are only
myopics in the economy dL >c L as noted above, but when there are only
prodigals in the economy, dL <c L. In order to prevent the prodigals from
emulating the poor, dL needs to be kept small and thus one gets the result
that dL <c L. When there are both Prodigals and Myopics in the economy
dL will still be smaller than cL but the diﬀerence will not be as pronounced.
T h ei m p a c to ft h em y o p i c si st oe n c o u r a g et h ep o o rt oi n c r e a s et h e i rs a v i n g ,
but that eﬀe c ti sn o tl a r g ee n o u g ht oo ﬀset the reduction in dL resulting from
prodigality.
The introduction of prodigals also has profound eﬀects on the M types
even when they do not act as myopics. In Table 4.1 the consumption of the
M types is much lower in period 2 than in period 1 even though βM =1 . The
18value of dM is low to prevent the Prodigals from emulating the M types. The
gap, cM − dM, i nf a c t ,i sl a r g e ri nT a b l e4 . 1t h a ni nT a b l e3 . 2e v e nt h o u g h
the M types act as myopics in Table 3.2 and do not do so in Table 4.1 These
results continue to hold for diﬀerent values of wM. Thus, these results hold
when comparing consumption levels of the M types in Tables 4.3 and 3.4 and
in Tables 4.5 and 3.6.
It is interesting to note that when one has both Prodigals and Myopics,
consumption of dM by the myopics is higher than when one only has Prodi-
gals. Also, the gap cM − dM is smaller in Table 4.2 than in Table 4.1. With
the intoduction of myopics in Table 4.2 the government implements policies
to induce the myopics to postpone consumption to period 2. These policies
a l s op r o v i d ei n c e n t i v e sf o rt h eLt y p e sa n dt h ePt y p e st oi n c r e a s et h e i r
consumption in period 2. The increase in consumption by the Prodigals in
period 2 means that period 2 consumption by the low productivity workers
and the myopics can be higher without the Prodigals having an incentive to
emulate them. These results also hold in comparing Table 4.3 with Table 4.4.
A comparison of Tables 4.5 and 4.6 shows that cM − dM is also smaller in
Table 4.6, however, one no longer gets the increase in dM.W h e nwM =5 ,
even with myopics, government policies do not increase dP as compared with
cP and so dM cannot rise without there being an increased likelihood that
the P’s would try to emulate the M’s. One should note that in this case the
MP constraint is not binding and hence from the ﬁrst order conditions one
gets the result that cP =dP.
When there are prodigals but no myopics in the economy, the prodigals
act rationally in the sense that they consume equal amounts in period one
and two. These results are seen in Tables 4.1, 4.3, and 4.5. However, when
one has both myopics and prodigals and wM >w P, consumption by the
p r o d i g a l si sg r e a t e ri np e r i o d2t h a ni np e r i o d1a sn o t e di nT a b l e s4 . 2a n d
4.4.
The impact on the H-types of introducing prodigals is also interesting.
In comparing the case of myopics with no prodigals (Table 3.2) with the one
where there are prodigals but no myopics (Table 4.1), one notices that when
there are prodigals the M-types consume much more in period one than in
period 2 and consume a great deal of leisure (y is only 4.873). This behavior
by the M-types means that even though they are very productive, MRS = 10,
they consume much more than they earn and thus end up receiving transfers
from the H-types. Thus, utility of the rich is lower when there are prodigals
(Table 4.1) than in their absence (Tables 3.1 or 3.2).
Once one has both prodigals and myopics (Table 4.2), dP is larger and
so dL and dM will be higher as well. In this situation cM is lower than when
there are no myopics, leisure is lower, and in fact total consumption of the
19myopics cM +dM will be less than the income of the myopics. Thus, transfers
by the rich will be lower and their utility will be higher than in Tables 3.1,
3.2, or 4.1. Similar results arise when wM =7 , although in this case utility
is higher for the rich when there are neither myopics nor prodigals than when
o n eo n l yh a sp r o d i g a l s .I nt h ec a s eo fwM =5 , the only change in the results
is that dP does not rise when one has both myopics and prodigals (Table 4.6)
because the MP constraint is not binding. Thus while utility of the rich will
be higher in Table 4.6 than in Tables 3.5 and 3.6, it is not higher than the
utility of the rich in Table 4.5.
If the goal is to increase saving, i.e., consumption in period 2, myopics
with no prodigals will result in the highest second period consumption. The
introduction of prodigals reduces second period consumption. When there
are both both myopics and prodigals in the economy, saving will be higher
than without myopics except when wM =5 , where the total amount of
consumption in period 2 will be approximately the same whether one has
just prodigals or both prodigals and myopics in the economy.
Table 5
Binding self-selection constraints
HM HL HP ML MP PL∗ PM
Commitment 1 v v v v
2v v v v v
3v v v
4v v v v v
5v v v v v v
6v v v v
No commitment 1 v v v v v
2v v v v v
3v v v v
4v v v v v
5v v v v v
6v v v v
∗ Without commitment, PLimplies that the prodigal does not consume cP and
dP in the ﬁrst period and dL in the second: u(cP)+u(dP) > u(cP + dP)+u(dL).
Finally, Table 6 presents the results from a redistributive viewpoint, com-
paring the utility between L and H in the 4 scenarios considered. (The larger
the number the larger the gap between the utility of the rich and the poor.)
20Table 6
No prodigals No prodigals Prodigals Prodigals
No myopic Myopic No myopic Myopic
wM =1 0 0.0551 0.0588 0.0970 0.1146
wM =7 0.1254 0.0872 0.1009 0.1392
wM =5 0.1091 0.1060 0.1540 0.1593
From table 6 it is clear that the worst case in terms of redistribution is
to have both myopics and prodigals in the economy. Having only prodigals
in the economy is better in terms of the utility gap between the rich and
the poor than having both myopics and prodigals in the economy. However,
having only myopics in the economy reduces the gap as compared to an
economy where there are only prodigals. Thus, if one had a choice of the
type of individuals to have in the economy, one would be better oﬀ with
myopics than with prodigals. Lastly, it is interesting that there are cases
where it is better to have myopics in the economy than to have neither the
myopics nor the prodigals.
6C o n c l u s i o n
One of the traditional rationales behind public pensions is the need to force
some individuals to save. It is argued that in the absence of public pensions,
some people would not save enough and when retired, they would have to
starve or to rely on social insurance. Why? Because at the time of saving,
their view of retirement is too vague and dominated by an urgent need for in-
stant gratiﬁcation. Besides such behavior of bounded rationality, some other
people who are perfectly rational, can strategically decide to consume all
their earnings in their ﬁrst period of life knowing that at retirement they can
count on social assistance. In the ﬁrst case a mandatory pension is viewed
as a commitment device; in the second, it is viewed as a way of providing
money for the poor in their old age but set up in such a way as to prevent
non-poor rational individuals from abusing a program that is not aimed at
them.
In general, these two questions are dealt with separately. In this paper
we mix the two behaviors. We make the myopics meet the prodigals. The
setting is that of optimal income taxation with two periods. The optimal
scheme forces the myopics to save for retirement and the prodigals not to
act as such. The interesting feature is that we have an increased number
of possibilities of mimicking among individuals, rich and poor, rational and
21myopic, prodigals and nonprodigals. To avoid prodigality and to deal with
myopia, diﬀerent policies are needed. For the prodigals not to act as such,
it is important not to have too a high pension for the poor and thus to
make ﬁrst period consumption relatively higher. To self-select the myopics,
on the contrary, second period consumption can be high. As we show, the
relative size of the myopics and of the prodigals plays an important role in
the analysis. Not surprisingly, in our optimal income taxation framework,
clearcut results cannot always be found. Hence we resort to a number of
numerical simulations. However, there are a few conclusions that stand out.
When there are only myopics in the economy, government policies that
try to make the myopics increase saving result in the poor consuming more
i nt h es e c o n dp e r i o dt h a ni nt h eﬁrst, the middle class rational individuals
tending to consume more in period two than in period one, and the myopics
saving more than they would have in a laissez-faire situation. However, once
one has prodigals in the economy the situation changes. In an economy with
rich, poor, myopics, and prodigals, under optimal government policies, con-
sumption of the poor in period 2 will be less than their consumpion in period
one so that there will be less incentive for the prodigals to act as prodigals.
This result will hold unless the myopics are a huge part of the population rel-
a t i v et ot h ep r o d i g a l s .O nt h eo t h e rh a nd, the prodigals will consume more in
period two than in period one. The incentives introduced to induce the my-
opics to increase their saving also have an eﬀect on the prodigals to consume
more in period two than in period one.
When there are myopics in the economy, government policy increases
saving and, in fact, makes saving larger than with a government run pension
fund where there are no myopics. When there are prodigals in the economy
but no myopics saving will be much lower. The attempt to keep the prodigals
from acting on their inclinations results in the reduced saving. Finally, when
there are both prodigals and myopics in the economy, saving will be higher
than when there are only prodigals but less than when there are only myopics.
One of the goals of public pensions is to improve redistribution. We ﬁnd
that the worst case in terms of redistribution is when one has both myopics
and prodigals in the economy. The redistribution is better when one has only
prodigals but it improves even more when there are only myopics. The reason
for the poor showing in the case when there are both myopics and prodigals
in the economy has as much to do with the improved showing of the wealthy
because of lower transfers than by a worsened showing by the poor.
Myopic individuals consume less in period two than in period one. How-
ever, we ﬁnd that when there are prodigals in the economy and constraint
PM binds, even when there are no myopics in the economy dM <c M. Thus,
in this case the M types appear to be acting as myopics even though there
22are no true myopics in the economy in this situation.
7A p p e n d i x
Appendix 1. Observability of earnings
In the text of the paper it was assumed that there are no labor market
eﬀects in constraints PL and PM when there is non-commitment. Since it
could be argued that labor market eﬀects should be included in the con-
straints, we add these constraints in the appendix to show how the results
are aﬀected by such an addition.


















































































































μPL = μn L

























































































































When one introduces labor market interactions, all the other equa-
tions derived for non-commitment remain the same as in the text.
In comparing the marginal rate of substitution for labor supply when
there is no commitment without and with labor market interactions one ﬁnds














































Without commitment but with Labor Market Interactions
7.1. βM =1; wM =1 0
cdy M R S U
H 2.841 2.841 7.584 10.000 -0.2066
L 2.493 1.571 1.796 3.323 -0.3152
M 2.841 2.841 7.584 10.000 -0.2066
P 2.209 2.209 2.880 2.060 -0.2324
7.2. βM =0; wM =1 0
cdy M R S U
H 2.869 2.869 7.508 10.000 -0.2009
L 2.055 1.581 1.825 1.954 -0.3528
M 3.027 2.454 7.117 10.000 -0.2017
P 2.069 2.466 2.939 1.798 -0.2289
7.3. βM =1; wM =7
cdy M R S U
H 2.822 2.822 7.635 10.000 -0.2105
L 2.258 1.398 1.984 3.329 -0.4017
M 2.261 2.261 4.943 4.070 -0.2578
P 2.018 2.018 3.297 2.356 -0.2927
7.4. βM =0; wM =7
cdy M R S U
H 2.785 2.785 7.737 10.000 -0.2185
L 1.931 1.483 1.982 2.077 -0.4091
M 2.582 1.969 4.913 5.949 -0.2646
P 2.007 2.336 3.245 2.209 -0.2601
7.5. βM =1; wM =5
cdy M R S U
H 2.613 2.613 8.245 10.000 -0.2620
L 2.109 1.296 2.125 3.332 -0.4733
M 3.792 1.501 3.808 24.093 -0.3408
P 1.896 1.896 3.538 2.415 -0.3408
257.6. βM =0; wM =5
cdy M R S U
H 2.713 2.713 7.941 10.000 -0.2353
L 1.788 1.450 2.122 2.023 -0.4565
M 2.504 1.762 3.815 6.974 -0.3255
P 2.022 2.129 3.204 2.177 -0.2748
Table 8
Binding self-selection constraints for labor market interactions
HM HL HP ML MP PL∗ PM
No commitment 1 v v v v
2v v v v
3v v v
4v v v v v
5v v v v
6v v v v v
When there are labor market interactions in constraints PL and PM there
a r eaf e wc h a n g e si nt h er e s u l t st h a ts h o u l db en o t e d .I nt a b l e s7 . 1a n d7 . 3
constraint PM does not bind and thus cM = dM,w h e r e a si nt h e t e x ti n
tables 4.1 and 4.3 constraint PM does hold yielding the result that cM >d M
even though there is no myopia. In table 7.5 PM does bind and so cM >d M,
a result similar to table 4.5 in the text. In relation to the prodigals, there is
ad i ﬀerence when wM =5 . In table 4.6 MP does not bind yielding cP = dP,
whereas in table 7.6 MP does bind and so cP <d P. The other diﬀerence
relates to the MRS for labor supply. In table 4 there is no distortion in labor
supply for type M’s. However, in table 7, except when wM =1 0 ,t h e r ei s a
distortion. When wM =7 , there is a downward distortion resulting from HM
binding and when wM =5 , there is a subsidy because PM binds. For the type
L’s the MRS for labor supply falls as long as constraint ML is binding (tables
4.2, 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6) and there are no labor market interactions; however,
when there are labor market interactions, the direction is less clear. It falls
in tables 7.2, 7.4, and 7.6 but rises in the others. As for the type P’s, MRS
falls when there are labor market interactions but in their absence rises in
tables 4.1, 4.3, 4.5, and 4.6, but falls in tables 4.2 and 4.4.
26Appendix 2. FOC conditions
FOC’s of the case with commitment
u
0 (cH)(nH + μHM + μHP + μHL)=μn H
u









(nH + μHM + μHP + μHL)=μn H
u
0 (cM)(nM − μHM + μMP + μML− μPM)=μn M
u



























μPM = μn M
u
0 (cP)(nP − μHP − μMP + μPL+ μPM)=μn P
u



























μMP = μn P
u
0 (cL)(nL − μPL− μML− μHL)=μn L
u




































μHL = μn L.
FOC’s of the case without commitment
u
0 (cH)(nH + μHM + μHP + μHL)=μn H
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(nH + μHM + μHP + μHL)=μn H
u
0 (cM)(nM − μHM + μMP + μML)=μn M
u


















μHM = μn M
u
0 (cP)(nP − μHP − μMP + μPL+ μPM) − u
0 (cP + dP)(μPL+ μPM)=μn P
u
0 (dP)(nP − μHP + μPL+ μPM) − u



























μMP = μn P
u
0 (cL)(nL − μHL − μML)=μn L
u



























μHL = μn L.
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